We study the evolution of the global arms trade network using a detailed dataset on all international transfers of major conventional weapons over the period . First, we provide a careful description of the characteristics of global arms trade using tools from social network analysis. Second, we relate our …ndings to political regimes by studying whether di¤erences in democratic status a¤ect the likelihood of arms trade by estimating an empirical gravity model of trade. Our …ndings from the network analysis are much in line with common views of the Cold War. The data reveal that there is very little trade between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and that the Warsaw Pact is substantially more centralised than NATO, with the Soviet Union being more central to the former than the United States to the latter. We …nd that di¤erences in democratic status has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on the likelihood of arms trade between two countries throughout the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, it is still the case that democracies are more prone to trade with other democracies and vice versa, but the reasons for this can be entirely accounted for by exporter and importer …xed e¤ects.
Introduction
Armed con ‡ict is arguably the single most important source of human su¤ering governed by mankind. Due to the high …xed costs and the extensive research and development involved in the production of military equipment, a global network of arms trade is a key catalyst for such con ‡icts. Given the security issues and moral considerations involved in arms trade, the lack of empirical evidence on the economics behind it, is striking. Who trades with whom? To what extent is arms trade strategic? Are governments concerned with the political regime of potential trading partners?
In this paper we study the evolution of the global arms trade network over the period . The analysis consists of two parts. First, we provide a thorough description of the characteristics of global arms trade using tools from social network analysis. Second, we study the e¤ect of di¤erences in polity between states on the likelihood of arms trade between them, using an empirical gravity model.
While the empirical evidence on arms trade is scarce, the Cold War inspired a theoretical literature on arms races, i.e. models of how two countries perceiving each other as threats react to increases in military expenditure or advancements in weapons technology from the perceived opponent. 1 Contributions include Schelling (1960) , Aumann et al. (1968) , Intriligator (1975) , Brito and Intriligator (1981) , Levine and Smith (1995) and, more recently, Baliga and Sjöström (2004) . Ayanian (1986) provides some empirical tests of theoretical predictions from the earlier literature. Levine et al. (1997) provide a thorough discussion of the economic fundamentals of arms trade in a paper with empirical features. The optimal design of arms control is modelled in Levine and Smith (1995) .
Since there already exists a substantial body of literature on the driving forces behind arms trade, we do not attempt to provide a theoretical model that can explain the arms trade pattern. Instead, we hope to gain some additional insights by addressing the subject from a new perspective and by approaching the data with novel analytical methods.
Social network analysis has supplied economists with an increasingly popular toolbox for analysing complex interactions between a large number of agents, see Jackson (2008) for an overview. While standard economic models typically consider a small group of agents or countries in isolation, the strength of network analysis lies in its ability to describe and analyse the interactions in a large system that would quickly become intractable using standard models.
Recently, network analysis has therefore started to gain recognition among trade economists and applied macroeconomists, see for instance De Benedictis and Tajoli (2008) , who study the global trade network and Flandreau and Jobst (2005, 2009) , who study the existence of strategic externalities in the international currency system.
We argue that network analysis is particularly suited for the study of arms trade for the following reasons. First, the fact that arms trade is heavily regulated allows us to think of arms traders and governments as roughly the same entity. 2 Second, the moral concerns and potential repercussions involved in arms trade suggest that decisions to trade in arms are strategic. Since governments are likely to choose its trading partners with great care, the arms trade network is therefore likely to re ‡ect a network of political ties and alliances. Using network theory, we are able to identify key players with central positions in the network and study how their roles have changed over time. Speci…cally, we are able to identify important di¤erences and similarities between the two intergovernmental military alliances dominating the post-war era, i.e. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
One key result from the network analysis is that there is a clear ideological divide in the international arms trade network during the Cold War. This begs the question of whether political regimes a¤ect the likelihood of arms trade. Following the descriptive network analysis, we therefore study the impact of di¤erences in political regimes on the likelihood of arms trade by adding factors capturing distance in polity and institutional measures to a gravity equation. 3 There are many reasons to believe that polity matters when choosing arms trade partners. A number of scholars subscribe to what is known as the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), see for instance Maoz and Russett (1993), de Mesquita et al. (1999) , Kadera et al. (2003) and Levy 2 As explained more carefully later, we exclude trade in small arms from the analysis due to considerable lack of data and the fact that governments have much less control over these types of weapons. 3 We are well aware of the fact that, when studying political regimes and arms trade, causality may run in both directions. In this paper, we therefore intepret our results with some caution and leave the issue of causality to a follow-up paper.
and Razin (2004) . According to this hypothesis, two democratic states are extremely unlikely to engage in militarised con ‡ict with each other. The DPT thus suggests that a democratic state is more apt to sell arms to another democratic state than to a non-democratic state since the probability of an armed con ‡ict is higher with the latter than the former. 4 We use a unique dataset from the Swedish Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI), covering all trade in military equipment over the period . We feel con…dent that the dataset is the richest dataset available on arms trade and have been assured of its high quality. 5 To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst to apply the aforementioned methodology on any dataset on arms trade and political regimes.
Our main …ndings are as follows. In the …rst part of the analysis, we …nd that while the global arms trade network possesses some characteristics typically found in empirical studies of other networks, we are also able to identify some important di¤erences. Similar to other networks, we …nd that the global arms trade network exhibits a small-world property, negative correlation between degree and clustering coe¢ cients and can be described by a scale-free degree distribution. The network is also characterised by negative assortativity, a feature found in other trade networks as described by De Benedictis and Tajoli (2008) . Our results suggest that the most central countries in the network are very in ‡uential. Moreover, there are large changes in key characteristics over time. The network as a whole becomes denser over time as an increasing number of countries start trading in arms and, additionally, form more links. In terms of network characteristics, there are substantial di¤erences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Throughout the Cold War, the NATO network is more decentralised than the Warsaw Pact and the largest trader within NATO, the US, is less in ‡uential than the largest trader in the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union. We believe these …ndings to be in line with how most people have come to view the hierarchy within the two organisations during the Cold War. 4 Mulligan et al. (2004) …nd that military expenditures are typically higher in autocracies than in democracies, and suggest that democratic leaders have less reason to worry about foreign military threats than a dictator. As noted by Cowen (1990) , a democratic leader is likely to go to war if he thinks that international victories will strengthen his probability of reelection and, as pointed out by Mulligan et al. (2004) , a democratic leader is more likely to attack a regime that his electorate resents.
5 Trade in small arms is excluded from the dataset. Since illegal trade is very di¢ cult for larger types of military equipment, the exclusion of small arms implies that we face a very small risk of measurement error.
In the second part of the analysis, we …nd that the largest arms exporters tend to trade arms with countries with similar political rule. The largest democracies export to democracies as well as autocracies but, with some exceptions, they tend to favour democracies. The largest autocracies have an even stronger bias towards other autocracies. To control for factors such as geographic proximity and colonial ties, we add distance in polity to a gravity-equation with the likelihood of arms trade as the dependent variable. We …nd that there is a stable negative relationship between di¤erences in polity and the likelihood of arms trade. The relationship is stable for the duration of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the inclusion of exporter and importer …xed e¤ects renders polity insigni…cant.
Since importer and exporter …xed e¤ects capture such characteristics as the size of the arms industry and proximity to unstable territories, our …ndings suggest that, during the Cold War, countries chose to trade arms with countries with similar political regimes irrespective of the country features captured by the …xed e¤ects. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, our …ndings indicate that while arms trade links continue to be formed among countries within the same political vicinity, the likelihood to trade is entirely driven by country speci…c …xed e¤ects capturing features unrelated to the political regime per se.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive analysis of the evolution of the global arms trade network using social network theory. Section 3 addresses the issue of polity and arms trade by reporting the results from estimating a gravity model. Section 4 concludes.
The Global Arms Trade Network
In this section we study the evolution of the global arms trade network over time. We begin with a discussion of the SIPRI dataset in Section 2.1. We then aggregate arms trade between countries over …ve-year intervals and graph the global arms trade in section 2.2. We then de…ne key centrality measures in Section 2.3. The evolution of these measures over time are reported in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
Throughout the section we study (i) all countries trading arms, (ii) countries trading arms with at least one full member of NATO (we call this set of countries the NATO Network ) and Table A1 in the Appendix. 7 The standard dataset for international trade, the United Nations'Comtrade dataset, also includes trade in arms, more speci…cally "Arms and ammunitions" (sector 891 under SITC Rev. 4). We believe, however, that the SIPRI dataset is much more suitable for this analysis for two main reasons. First, the UN data is collected by national customs authorities and therefore susceptible to political manipulation due to the nature of these goods. The SIPRI, on the other hand, collects its data from a much wider range of sources and is completely transparent as regards the exact content of any trade. Second, the UN data contains many "dual use" goods which are suitable for both civilian and military use. An example would be optical equipment that can be used separately as binoculars or mounted on ri ‡es. The SIPRI data is much more focused on larger types of goods and on items intended exclusively for military use. 8 The entire arms trade network remains connected throughout the sample period except for one trade in 2000 between Cap Verde and Malawi where this pair is isolated from the rest of the network. We choose to drop these two countries from the sample which results in a negligible loss of 22 out of 14,343 observations in the sample.
Graphs of The Arms Trade Network
In order to be able to graph the evolution of the arms trade network over time, we …rst compute …ve-year averages of bilateral arms trade and plot them. 9 Figure 1 displays the arms trade network over the period 1950-1954 and Figure 2 , the network over the period 1970-1974. 10 Due to space constraints we only include a selection of graphs in the paper, but all omitted plots are available on request. In these graphs, each node represents a country and each link indicates that there is trade between the two countries in question. The length of each link is thus not proportional to the magnitude of the trade, they simply indicate whether trade has occurred during the period. The arrows run from exporter to importer. 
Network theory: De…nitions and Key Concepts
We next describe some key statistics for characterising the evolution of the arms trade network over time. Let N = f1; :::; ng denote the set of nodes in the network. Each node represents a country. Let g represent an n n matrix where g ij represents the link between countries i and 9 We choose to illustrate …ve-year averages simply due to space constraints. 1 0 All network graphs are processed using the Pajek software. We use the Kamada-Kawai method of energising the data for the layouts as this seems to produce more stable results than for instance the Fruchterman Reingold energy command; see de Nooy et al. (2005) . j. For our purposes, it is the existence of arms trade rather than the magnitude of the trade that matters, and we therefore think of each link as having equal strength. In other words, we think of the network as being unweighted and de…ne g ij = 1 if i and j are trading arms 0 otherwise .
The neighbourhood of a node i in the network g is the set of nodes linked to i:
The degree of a node, d i (g); is the number of links that involve that node, i.e.
A path between nodes i and j is a sequence of links i 1 i 2 ; i 2 i 3 ; :: is distinct. A path never hits the same node twice. The distance between two nodes is the number of links in the shortest path (geodesic) between them. For future reference, denote the distance between i and j by l(i; j).
We next de…ne key micro statistics pertaining to individual nodes. These concepts are important in identifying and characterising important players in the network. It is useful to start with a description of these individual characteristics as some of the de…nitions are needed when describing the properties of the network at large.
Degree Centrality The degree centrality of country i is computed as
A country with degree n 1 would be trading arms with every other country in the network.
By contrast, a country with a low degree would be considered less central. Since the maximum degree is n 1, the measure of degree centrality is con…ned within the unit interval.
The degree centrality-measure has some shortcomings. While it does provide some indication of connectedness, it says nothing about how close each node is to other nodes or about the location in the network.
Closeness Centrality Closeness centrality tracks how close a node i is to any other node j in the network. Recall that l(i; j) denotes the number of links in the shortest path between i and j. Closeness centrality is de…ned as
Closeness centrality thus measures the inverse average distance between i and j.
Betweenness Centrality Let P i (jk) denote the number of shortest paths between nodes j and k that i lies on and let P (jk) be the total number of shortest paths between j and k.
The ratio P i (jk)=P (jk) captures the importance of i in connecting j and k.
is close to one, country i lies on most of the geodesics between j and k. If the ratio is close to zero, country i is less important in connecting j and k. Betweenness centrality is de…ned as
Betweenness centrality is thus a measure of the ratio of P i (jk)=P (jk); averaged across all pairwise nodes j and k that meet the above criteria.
We next de…ne some key statistics that are useful when attempting to characterise the network as a whole.
Diameter The diameter of the network is the largest distance between any two nodes in the network. It thus provides an upper-bound measure of the size of the network.
Density The density of the network is computed as the average degree divided by n 1, i.e.
Degree Distribution The degree distribution, P (d), of the network captures the relative frequencies, i.e. fractions of nodes that have di¤erent degrees, d. A power distribution (scalefree distribution) satis…es:
where c > 0 normalises the support of P to sum to 1: Taking logs we obtain:
Using actual data on the observed distribution of degrees, can be estimated from this formulation.
Overall Clustering Clustering coe¢ cients describe how connected nodes in the network are. Overall clustering of the network is de…ned as
To understand this concept, consider two nodes, ij and ik, sharing the common node i. The measure of average clustering measures how common it is that also the nodes j and k are linked to each other.
Average Clustering In order to compute the average clustering coe¢ cient, we …rst need to de…ne individual clustering. The individual clustering coe¢ cient is given by:
The individual clustering coe¢ cient of node i therefore considers all pairs of nodes that it is linked to, and then registers how many of them are linked to each other. The average clustering coe¢ cient is then the average of all individual clustering coe¢ cients, i.e.
Average clustering gives more weight to low-degree nodes than the overall clustering coe¢ cient.
Max Degree The Max Degree of the network, Ce D i ; is the degree of the node with the highest number of links.
Max Closeness The Max Closeness of the network, Ce C i , is the value of Closeness Centrality of the node with the highest measure of this statistic.
Max Betweenness The Max Betweenness of the network, Ce B i , is the value of Betweenness Centrality of the node with the highest measure of this statistic.
Degree Centrality The Degree Centrality of the network is given by:
(n 2) (n 1) .
Closeness Centrality The Closeness Centrality of the network is given by:
Betweenness Centrality The Betweenness Centrality of the network is given by:
.
Assortativity Turning to the correlation patterns among high-degree nodes, we turn to the concept of assortativity. If high-degree nodes tend to be connected to other high-degree nodes, there is said to be positive assortativity. The degree of assortativity of the network g is computed as The number of countries that trade in arms increases rapidly during the sample period.
Characteristics of the Arms Trade Network
The diameter increases as well but remains very low throughout the sample, a feature of many networks often referred to as the small world property, see for instance Goyal et al. (2006) .
We see that the country with the highest number of links, as measured by max degree, is increasing in the beginning of the sample but is starting to decrease at the end of the Cold War.
While overall clustering has increased, average clustering has been falling over time. While the NATO network is becoming more dense over time, the Warsaw Pact density is falling sharply up to its disestablishment in 1991. We also see that the max degree is much higher in NATO than in the Warsaw Pact, indicating that the US has more links than the USSR for the duration of the Cold War. This is hardly surprising given that NATO is larger.
Regarding the centrality measures, they are all relatively stable over time but show that the Warsaw Pact was a much more centralised network than NATO. This can also be seen in the network graphs in Figure 1 where the Warsaw Pact network most clearly resembles a "star" network with one central node (the USSR) surrounded by peripheral trading partners who, as a rule, do not trade with each other. This property is also revealed by the fact that the overall clustering variable is substantially lower in the Warsaw Pact than in NATO throughout the sample. A de…ning property of a star network is precisely that while the central country trades with many other countries, these are unlikely to trade with each other. The fact that the USSR was more important for the Warsaw Pact than the United States was for NATO is shown by the measures of maximum centrality being higher for the Warsaw Pact than for NATO throughout the period.
The main di¤erences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact can be summarised as follows.
(i) There is a distinct division between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, most clearly in the beginning. Towards the end of the sample, an increasing number of countries trade with both alliances.
(ii) More countries participate in the NATO network than in the network of the Warsaw Pact.
(iii) The Warsaw Pact is substantially more centralised than NATO.
(iv) The role of the USSR in the Warsaw Pact is more important than that of the United States in NATO.
(v) NATO is internally better connected and the United States is much more clustered than the USSR.
(vi) Density falls sharply for the Warsaw Pact but not for NATO.
The graphic division between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is a naive but compelling indication that polity matters for arms trade ties. It is well known that throughout the post-war era, the con ‡ict between the US and the Soviet Union was based on radically di¤erent ideological beliefs. While the constitution in the US is based on maximum freedom of individuals, the Soviet Union has come to represent the other extreme; autocratic rule by a highly centralised government. This ideological divide seems to be mirrored in the arms trade network.
The results from the network analysis suggest that the Warsaw Pact network, centered around the Soviet Union, comprises mainly other autocratic states. Conversely, the NATO network consists mainly of democratic states and is centered around the world's oldest and largest democracies; the US, the UK and France. 12 While this is circumstancial evidence that, his-torically, polity has been of great importance when choosing arms trade partners, we look for statistical support for this conjecture in Section 3.2, below.
The Subset of Countries Trading in 1950
The increasing density and complexity of the arms trade network can be due to one of two factors. It is either the case that a large number of new countries have entered the network, or that the countries that have been trading all along are forming more links and trading more with each other. This raises the concern that the decreasing importance of the divide between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is due to increasing noise rather than some fundamental change in the connections between East and West. In order to address this issue, we identify the subsample of countries that were trading in 1950 and study how this sub-network has evolved over time. Finally, Figure A3 displays the evolution of characteristics of the 1950 sub-network. The graph suggests that the properties of the network are similar to those of the network as a whole, except for the decreasing sample size as some countries vanish from the set.
Polity and Arms Trade
Having characterised the global arms trade network and how it evolves over time, we next turn to the empirical relationship between arms trade and political regimes. We therefore add data on political and economic characteristics and estimate a gravity equation where one of the independent variables is a measure of distance in polity. 
Polity of destination
Mean polity of all destinations 
Trends in Democratisation
Before proceeding with the regressions, it is useful to take a …rst look at the data by studying trends in the variables and plotting key relationships. We next address the question of whether countries are more likely to export arms to countries with the same polity. Figure 9 displays the POLITY-scores of the export destinations of the US, the UK, France, Sweden, the USSR and China over the period . Each dot represents the POLITY-score of each export destination in a given year and the black line indicates the per-year average. The top left graph of the US shows that the world's oldest democracy has consistently been prone to export arms to other democracies. However, as the graph shows, the US has also exported arms to autocratic countries throughout the sample period. There is a positive trend in the plot for the US, indicating that the US has chosen to export arms to countries that have become increasingly democratic. However, this could just be symptomatic of the overall tendency to world democratisation rather than of the US becoming increasingly choosy when deciding which countries to export to. The patterns for the UK, France and Sweden are more erratic. The UK and France have been prone to export arms to other democracies except for in the 1970s and, in the case of France up to the mid-1980s.
Sweden has mainly stayed on the democratic-side of the horizontal axis except for in a few years in the late 1970s when there was a tendency to export arms to non-democracies, albeit with average POLITY-scores close to zero.
By contrast, the USSR and China have typically exported arms to other autocratic countries. The data suggest that they have exported arms to democracies as well, but the average trading partner has been non-democratic. There is some evidence that China started exporting more arms to democratic countries in the beginning of the 21th century, but the trend has been reversed in recent years.
The results also suggest that, compared to NATO members, the USSR and China have been relatively more prone to export arms to countries with similar POLITY-scores. This indicates that, in the sample, autocracies have an even stronger bias towards other autocracies than democracies vis-à-vis other democracies.
The Gravity Equation
As reported in the previous section, plotting the data suggests that there is a correlation between polity divergence and arms trade. To formally test this hypothesis, we include distance in POLITY-scores as an explanatory variable in a gravity speci…cation, controlling for a wide range of factors that may in ‡uence the choice of trading partners. Throughout the regression analysis, we estimate linear probability models with and without importer and exporter …xed e¤ects. 14 Suppose that we have i = 1; :::; N countries in the sample. Let A ij and ! A ijt be dichotomous variables such that A ijt = 1 if countries i and j trade in arms at time t 0 otherwise and ! A ijt = 1 if country i exports arms to country j at time t 0 otherwise .
We de…ne the variable B ijt as assuming the value 1 if i and j share the same border (contiguity), L ijt , assuming the value 1 if i and j share the same o¢ cial language, CR ijt , assuming the value 1 if i and j were ever in a colonial relationship, CC 45 ijt , assuming the value 1 if the countries were colonised by the same country post-1945, CR 45 ijt , assuming the value 1 if the countries were in a colonial relationship post-1945 and …nally, SC ijt , assuming the value 1 if the countries were the same country historically. Let D ijt denote distance between i and j, let Y it Y jt denote the product of GDP in country i and j, let Y C it Y C jt denote the product of GDP per capita in country i and j, and let RY C ijt be relative GDP per capita between i and j, i.e. RY C ijt = Y C it Y C jt : Finally, let P it be the POLITY-score of country i at time t. We then estimate the following linear probability models:
8i 6 = j where is a vector of parameters and X ijt is a vector of controls described above. 15 A signi…cant negative estimate of thus suggests that the more di¤erent i and j are in terms of polity, the less likely they are to trade in arms. The dummy variables d Xi and d M i assume the value 1 if country i is the exporter and importer, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 16 We thus estimate gravity models with and without importer and exporter …xed e¤ects. It is not obvious whether …xed e¤ects should be included. Fixed e¤ects will capture all countryspeci…c di¤erences some of which may be of great importance to arms trade. Therefore, the estimation without …xed e¤ects measures the general correlation between di¤erences in polity and likelihood to trade in arms, but disregards country-speci…c characteristics. Some countries, such as the US or the UK, may for instance be more involved in arms trade due the magnitude of their domestic arms trade industries and some countries may be trading extensively due to being endowed with much military equipment, such as the Ukraine after the breakup of the USSR. Models without …xed e¤ects also fail to take into account whether countries exhibiting 1 5 The set of control variables could possibly be augmented to include alliance a¢ liation and measures of the network chacracteristics. Including the latter might admittedly provide an interesting connection between the network analysis and the regression analysis. However, as with alliance a¢ liation, variables capturing the network characteristics are endogenous to the dependent variable and including them would not be meaningful.
1 6 We do not apply country-pair …xed e¤ects to the gravity equation since our outcome variable is binary, i.e. measures whether trade occurs or not, and therefore does not contain enough variation. Moreover, the empirical trade literature has recently paid attention to the absence of trade between many countries, even at the aggregate level. Helpman et al. (2008) report that as many as half of all aggregate bilateral trade ‡ows assume the value zero (these are often dropped from the sample by researchers using logarithmic values) and suggest a structural estimation procedure building on …rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003) . However, we do not believe …rm heterogeneity to be the driving force behind arms trade and …nd a linear probability approach more appropriate.
high risk of military con ‡ict, such as the Koreas or Turkey, are more prone to import arms.
When …xed e¤ects are included, the estimate will show the e¤ect of di¤erences in polity on the likelihood of arms trade taking such country-speci…c e¤ects into account.
Since far from all countries trade in arms and since the POLITY-score ‡uctuates greatly with max (P it P jt ) 2 = 400, our estimates of are likely to be quantitatively small and are unlikely to accurately reveal the importance of distance in polity for the likelihood of arms trade. In order to provide meaningful interpretations of the extimated -coe¢ cients, we convert them into implied relative probabilities by taking into account the maximum variation of the POLITY-score and by relating the probability that two countries with di¤erent polities trade in arms to the probability that any two countries trade in arms. For the estimations without …xed e¤ects we compute the implied relative likelihood, b , as follows:
where P max and P min are the maximum and minimum POLITY-scores, respectively, b is the estimate from (9) and arms is the empirical probability that arms trade occurs in the sample.
At each point in time, the probability of arms trade is given by
where A ij is de…ned above and N is the number of countries. For the …xed e¤ects estimations the implied relative likelihood is computed in the same way, but the average probability is slightly modi…ed since the sample size increases when the direction of trade is taken into account.
The implied relative likelihood, b , thus measures how much less likely it is that two countries with the maximum distance in polity trade in arms than two countries with the minimum distance in polity when the overall probability of arms trade is taken into account.
As mentioned in the introduction, trade in arms is likely to exhibit some unique properties that separates it from trade in any other good. In an attempt to identify the e¤ects of these unique features of arms trade, we estimate (9) also for aggregate trade in non-military goods.
Results
The results from estimating (9) and (10) Table 1 . Columns (1)-(3) display the results without …xed e¤ects, i.e. model (9), and columns (4)- (6) the results when exporter and importer …xed e¤ects are included as in model (10). Columns (7)- (10) (4)- (6) indicate that these …ndings are robust to the inclusion of importer and exporter …xed e¤ects.
Even when taking into account …xed country characteristics such as the size of the arms industry and proximity to war zones, countries are more likely to trade with states in their political vicinity
In light of the dramatic changes in the arms trade network structure discussed in Section 2, it is of great interest to study whether the e¤ect of polity on the likelihood of arms trade is stable over time. Figure 10 displays the implied relative likelihood derived from thecoe¢ cients obtained when estimating (9) and (10) The results without …xed e¤ects suggest that the estimate for arms trade is negative and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for almost every year in the sample. The negative likelihood decreases somewhat over time but remains negative throughout the sample period. When including …xed e¤ects in the right panel, we see that the e¤ect of distance in polity remains negative for the duration of the Cold War but tends to zero after 1990. Sample 1950 Sample -2007 Sample 1950 Sample -1989 Sample 1990 Sample -2007 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) How can we reconcile these …ndings? Recall that …xed e¤ects allow us to control for countryspeci…c characteristics such as the size of the arms trade industry and the technology available and that the …xed e¤ects therefore are likely to proxy for the extent of trade. Excluding …xed e¤ects implies that any e¤ect of polity that we observe may be due to selection: perhaps democratic countries happen to trade with democratic countries simply because the latter group tends to produce arms. Including …xed e¤ects, however, allows us to purge the estimates of such e¤ects. The results in the right panel in Figure 9 thus suggest that, even when controlling for country characteristics, arms traders chose to trade with states with similar polity throughout the Cold War. We may thus conclude that it is the political regime and not other circumstances that is the driving force behind these trade alliances. After 1990, however, any negative correlation between distance in polity and the likelihood of arms trade that we …nd, is entirely absorbed by the country-speci…c …xed e¤ects. The political regime, it seems, therefore played an important role prior to the fall of the Soviet Union but has been of no importance in recent years. This is a key …nding. (9) and (10) repeat this exercise on the post-1990 sample. The results con…rm our previous …ndings that any e¤ects of distance in polity that we …nd can be accounted for by exporter and importer …xed e¤ects. This suggests that the importance of polity has decreased over time and has in fact vanished completely in the last two decades.
As a robustness check, we also estimate (9) and (10) for aggregate trade to see whether distance in polity has any impact on the likelihood of trade in non-military goods. To be able to compare the two, we plot the results for arms trade along with the corresponding implied likelihood for aggregate trade in other goods in Figure 10 . We …nd no negative e¤ects of distance in polity on the likelihood of aggregate trade. The correlation is positive before 1990 and then tends to zero. The positive correlation found for aggregate trade may be driven by factors unrelated to polity, such as comparative advantage, factor endowments or natural resources. 17
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the evolution of the global arms trade network using a unique dataset on all international transfers of major conventional weapons over the period . The analysis consists of two parts. First, we characterise global arms trade over the sample period, using methods from social network analysis. Second, we address the relationship between distance in POLITY-scores and likelihood of arms trade, using a gravity equation augmented by political and economic controls.
The …rst part of the analysis reveals that the arms trade network shares common traits with other networks, notably a small world property, negative correlation between degree and clustering coe¢ cients and a scale-free degree distribution. Moreover, the network exhibits negative assortativity, a property found to characterise other trade networks as well.
The data mirrors common views of the ideological divide of the Cold War. There is a clear division between NATO and the Warsaw Pact until the disestablishment of the latter in 1991.
Moreover, the Warsaw Pact is more centered around the Soviet Union than NATO around the US; the Warsaw Pact thus closely resembles a star network with a number of peripheral traders interacting almost exclusively with the USSR.
The sharp dichotomy between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is an indication that, historically, political rule has been a key determinant when choosing arms trading partners. In the second part of the analysis we seek to quantify this relationship by relating distance in POLITY-scores to the likelihood of arms trade. Estimating a gravity equation on the full sample, we …nd evidence that di¤erences in polity have a signi…cant, negative e¤ect on the likelihood that arms trade occurs. Estimating the relationship for each year in the sample, reveals that the negative relationship is stable throughout the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, any e¤ects that we observe can be explained by the inclusion of exporter and importer …xed e¤ects.
with countries within their political vicinity, even after taken into account country-speci…c characteristics such as the size of the arms industry and geographic location. The importance of polity has, however, diminished greatly over time. Polity, it seems, no longer matters for arms trade decisions after 1990. The evidence suggests that democracies are still inclined to trade with democracies and vice versa, but this selection is not driven by similarities in polity.
The propensity for countries to trade with states with similar political rule may be due to some type of habit formation in arms imports. Due to technological constraints, a certain category of arms may not be compatible with products from another country and it may therefore be that once a trade alliance is formed, the relationship is, by necessity, sustained over the long term. 
